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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
FOREWORD: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL
DECISION-MAKING
H. EMORY WIDENER, JR.*
A review of the cases before the Fourth Circuit this past year and my
own experience as a judge lead me to characterize the year as uneventful
but very active. The most significant feature of the year is probably not
any particular case or even a trend in any single area; rather, it embraces
every area. I refer to the substantial and unflagging increase in this cir-
cuit's calendar.
The Fourth Circuit now leads the nation in the number of cases dock-
eted per judge, a trend that apparently will continue. In 1979, there were
17.1% more filings in this court than in the previous year, far beyond the
6.9% average increase generated in the other ten circuits. Only the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit felt a sharper rise during the year. Even more
notably, this circuit led the country with a 45.9% upswing in appeals
lodged since 1975. The average increase for the other circuits in that pe-
riod was only 21.4%. 1
In seeking to discover why this circuit's workload has multiplied in
such measure, one cannot ignore, and indeed must focus on, the uneven
number of prisoner appeals pressed on this court. While fewer than 10%
of the appeals pursued in the federal courts in 1979 were noted in the
Fourth Circuit, this court accounted for over 25% of the entire prisoner
appeals. Even more dramatic is the fact that judges in the circuit must
engage in upwards of four times as many prisoner appeals than their
counterparts in the other circuits.
2
The reason for the ill-balanced number of prisoner cases and the in-
creasingly overburdening litigation for each judge must be traced to the
court's expansion of prisoner privileges. I refer to a trend in our decisions
that accepts opinions of the United States Supreme Court as the starting
point for a doctrine, rather than a statement of the doctrine itself. Five
years ago, in McCray v. Burrell,3 Judge Field in dissent accurately ana-
lyzed the effect the court's philosophy in the area of prisoners' claims has
on the case load of the court. He "discern[ed] something more than a
mere coincidental correlation between these disturbing statistics [refer-
ring to the large percentage of prisoner appeals] and the philosophy of
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
1 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1979 4, 13.
2 Id.
3 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975).
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judicial lenity evidenced by the majority. . . ."" In 1975, the Fourth Cir-
cuit ranked fourth among the circuits in the number of appeals per judge.
Judge Field's observation is even more evident today, for the court now
leads the nation in that statistic.
Although in no way do I argue that the court should give anything but
the most thorough consideration to meritorious claims, the expansive de-
cisions have led to frivolous litigation by prisoners that increasingly clogs
the court's dockets. Indeed, the barrage of suits filed by prisoners who
flout the judicial system may in the end do the greatest harm to those
prisoners having meritorious claims, which may be lost in the shuffle of
the constantly growing fill of cases.
This discussion relates to the opportunity for judges to meet their re-
sponsibilities adequately. Moreover, it is of great importance to ordinary
law abiding citizens to have a right to demand that the courts hear their
controversies promptly and with the severest solicitude possible, unde-
layed by frivolous claims of prisoners, many of whom commence numer-
ous suits each year with no more merit to the last than the first.
Although additional judgeships will help to ease the pressure on indi-
vidual judges, trends indicate that the relief will be only temporary.
Therefore, the problems discussed above must be given close considera-
tion so that the quality of our judicial system will not suffer. I do not here
suggest the answer, but I do suggest that until the courts and the Con-
gress recognize the problem for what it is, rather than sugar coating it as I
think is now being done, merely throwing more judges into the breach
will solve nothing in the long haul. Unless there are fundamental deci-
sions made to delineate the proper matters of business of the federal
courts, I fear that the very proliferation of our regulation into each nook
and crany of human affairs may well undermine the public confidence so
necessary to us for the continuance of our fundamental function.
Developments in this circuit in the area of criminal procedure have
been somewhat more interesting than in most other areas of the law, and
a few significant cases are worthy of note. Some of these cases seem to
give the police greater powers, while others give greater protection to de-
fendants and prisoners. An expanded view of what constitutes an ex-
tended border search allows law enforcement authorities greater flex-
ibility in dealing with drug importers, while an expanded definition of
"interrogation" provides greater protection for defendants in custody. Al-
though defendants can now rely on plea bargain offers and have a reason-
able time in which to accept such offers, once convicted they can go to jail
on the evenly divided vote of an appellate court. The constitutional pro-
hibition of cruel and unusual punishment now limits the length of a jail
sentence that a jury can impose, but, despite a recent decision to the con-
trary, probably does not limit the practice of "double celling."
The court refined the law relating to searches and seizures under the
fourth amendment, the most noteworthy case being United States v.
Id. at 375.
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Bilir.5 Bilir upheld a warrantless search and seizure that produced heroin
in the Pennsylvania Railroad Station in downtown Baltimore. The search
and seizure, which occurred several miles from the port and several hours
after the heroin had been brought into the country, was justified on the
theory that it was an extended border search. The government agents had
deliberately delayed searching the suspects when it was believed that
they were importing heroin. The court decided that the government's de-
lay was permissible because it "was motivated in major part to make sus-
picion more reasonable by further observation."6 Moreover, the govern-
ment had kept a continuous surveillance on the suspects from the time
they brought in the heroin at the port until they were searched at the
train station. The court refused to extend Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States,7 to preclude the warrantless search in this case, noting that in
Almeida-Sanchez there was no "reasonable suspicion that material re-
cently illegally imported would be disclosed by the search." 8
If it can be said that the Fourth Circuit, as exemplified by Bilir, has
allowed the government somewhat greater flexibility with respect to the
potential defendant in its investigation of suspected criminal activity, it
must also be said that the court has expanded the rights of the suspect
once he becomes an actual defendant. Two cases from the past year are
indicative of that expansion.
In Henry v. United States," the court found an interrogation under
circumstances in which one might have thought no interrogation had oc-
curred. The court held that an undisclosed government informant's con-
versation in jail with an indicted defendant constitutes an interrogation,
even if the informant does not initiate the discussion regarding the crime
for which the defendant has been charged. The government's action, it
was held, violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel, and
thus prohibited the use of any information elicited during the
interrogation.
Cooper v. United States0 continued the expansion of a criminal de-
fendant's constitutional rights. The court held that the government's
withdrawal of a plea bargain proposal prior to the defendant's communi-
cation of acceptance to the government violated both the defendant's
constitutional right to fundamental fairness embraced within substantive
due process guarantees and his sixth amendment right to effective assis-
tance of counsel. Even though, under classical contract theory, no binding
contract had been formed, the court still required the government to ful-
' 592 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1979); see FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW: Criminal Procedure, infra
at 521.
" 592 F.2d at 740 n.9.
7 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
592 F.2d at 742.
590 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'd 48 U.S.L.W. 4703 (U.S. June 16, 1980); see FOURTH
CmcuIT REVIEW: Criminal Procedure, infra at 589.
10 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979); see FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW: Criminal Procedure, infra
at 480.
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fill its proposal to the defendant. The net result of this decision is that
whenever an assistant United States Attorney communicates a plea bar-
gaining proposal to a defendant, the government is required to keep the
offer open until a reasonable time passes. This is true even where the
assistant attorney had no authority to offer the plea bargain in the first
place, where the assistant's supervisor directs him immediately to with-
draw the proposal, and where the withdrawal has in no way harmed the
defendant.
The single case arousing the most public interest heard by the court
last year was United States v. Mandel.1 Marvin Mandel, governor of
Maryland at the time of these proceedings, and others were convicted on
mail fraud and racketeering charges arising out of activities involving the
Marlboro Race Track in Maryland. A panel of this court reversed those
convictions on evidentiary and jury instruction grounds. 12 An en banc
court upon rehearing affirmed the convictions by an equally divided vote
of 3-3. That per curiam opinion reveals that a majority of the court would
affirm the convictions on the evidentiary questions but that the court was
equally divided on the jury instruction issues. Soon thereafter two new
judges were appointed to the court, and a subsequent petition for rehear-
ing en banc before the enlarged court was denied.
Governor Mandel then filled a petition for a writ of mandamus in the
United States Supreme Court against the court. 3 That writ seeks to have
the panel decision of this court reaffirmed on two grounds. First, it asserts
that a rehearing by an en banc court can only review the actions of the
panel and therefore an equally divided decision would affirm the panel
decision, not the district court's decision. The petitioner's alternative
claim is that because the judgment of the panel of this court was never
vacated the en banc court did not have the power to ignore that decision
and affirm the convictions. Governor Mandel has also sought certiorari in
the Supreme Court. 4 If the petition for certiorari were granted, then it
would be very doubtful that the petition for mandamus should proceed
further, mandamus being generally unavailable if there is any other rem-
edy. On the other hand, if certiorari is denied, then the Supreme Court
will have to dispose of the mandamus petition by one means or another,
either on its merits or on procedural grounds.
In Davis v. Davis,5 an en banc court affirmed the granting of a writ of
habeas corpus on the grounds that a sentence of forty years imprisonment
and $20,000 fine for possession of less than nine ounces of marijuana
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment for a known narcotics dealer.
Reversing the panel decision, the en banc court concluded that the penal-
" 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979); see FOURTH CiRcurr REVIEW: Criminal Procedure, infra
at 502.
12 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979).
13 48 U.S.L.W. 3452 (1979).
14 Id.




ties imposed were so disproportionate to the offenses that they violated
the eighth amendment even though they were well within the State statu-
tory limitations. The case is most interesting because no other court, to
my knowledge, has ever concluded that a sentence to a term of years
within State statutory limitations was unconstitutional merely because
excessive. Adding to the significance of the decision is the fact that the
terms of years were fixed by a jury and not by a judge.
Our holding in Johnson v. Levine,16 that two Maryland penal institu-
tions were in violation of the eighth amendment's mandate against cruel
and unusual punishment primarily because of their practice of double cel-
ling now seems questionable in light of the Supreme Court's holding in
Bell v. Wolfish.17 There the Supreme Court held that the double ceiling
of pretrial detainees did not violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. Although the Court in Bell applied the due process clause
rather than the eighth amendment, a strong argument is that a similar
condition existing for other prisoners would be constitutional since a pre-
trial detainee has at least the same rights as a prisoner.18
If in the area of criminal procedure neither the cops nor the robbers
can claim a clear victory in the Fourth Circuit this year, in the area of
environmental law, neither the environmentalists nor the industrialists
can claim victory. Two noteworthy cases involved challenges to new regu-
lations. In one, we held that Environmental Protection Agency regula-
tions will be struck down if the Agency fails to live up to the law's proce-
dural requirements. 19 However, where the agency does abide by the
applicable statutes and regulations, reasonable regulations will, of course,
be upheld and given full effect.20 This approach, if it may be called that,
of applying and enforcing the law's procedural requirements, should en-
sure that the administrative rulemaking process affords each of the com-
peting interests a fair hearing.
The circuit's principal task in the area of employment discrimination
law was to give effect to recent Supreme Court decisions, principally In-
'ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,21 and Hazelwood
School District v. United States."2 This court, applying Teamsters in
Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co.,2 3 determined that section 703(h) of Title
VII24 insulated a bona fide seniority system, but at the same time upheld
16 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1979); see FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW: Criminal Procedure, infra
at 540.
17 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
I See id. at 558.
19 National Crushed Stone Ass'n v. EPA, 601 F.2d 111 (4th Cir. 1979); see FOURTH
CIRcuiT REvIEw: Environmental Law, infra at 632.
20 Consolidated Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1979); see FOURTH CIRCUIT
R vmw: Environmental Law, infra at 632.
21 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
22 433 U.S. 297 (1977).
2- 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978); see FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW: Employment Discrimina-
tion, infra at 605.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(H) (1976).
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the district court's grant of broad relief in other aspects of the case. Per-
haps more significant, and certainly of greater public interest, is the gui-
dance that Sledge provides in the controversial area of quotas. Without
ruling on the abstract validity of quotas, the court determined that hiring
and promotional quotas are appropriate only under limited and compel-
ling circumstances, and that whenever possible, discrimination victims
should be afforded full and effective relief without resort to the extreme
procedure of quotas. The effect, if any, of United. Steelworkers of
America v. Weber,2 5 on this decision is yet to be determined.
Other recent cases, EEOC v. Radiator Specialty C0.2 6 and EEOC v.
United Virginia Bank27 teach that the EEOC will be held to the require-
ment of proving a prima facie case, and to its burden of proof, as any
other litigant is. In using statistics to show disparate impact, a court may
rely only on valid and proper statistics. The statistics should take into
account and exclude pre-Act hiring when appropriate and must reflect
the Supreme Court's determination that even after the enactment of Ti-
tle VII not every individual is qualified for every job. On the issue of
special qualifications, Radiator Specialty provides procedural guidance.
Trial judges should use discovery and pre-trial to identify this as either
an issue of law or fact, and if the latter then the employer bears the bur-
den of proving that a position requires special qualifications. Moving by
inches rather than by feet, the court is making sure that everyone in-
volved is complying with the law's existing requirements, rather than es-
tablishing new requirements. Hill v. Western Electric C0.2 8 exemplifies
the trend in this area. There the district court upheld the plaintiff's
claims and granted extensive relief. This court upheld some of those find-
ings but reversed others and remanded to ensure that the same rules of
procedure and evidence (and common sense) were applied as in all other
cases. "We do not employ babes at high salaries to lead men doing hourly
rated work."2 9
In the civil rights field, although no new rights were created, there
were no cutbacks and existing rights were given full force and effect. Doe
v. Kenley30 makes clear that where a state has established a policy
designed to eliminate medicaid funding for nontherapeutic abortions, the
state cannot implement that policy by providing reimbursement only
when the physician certifies that the mother's life was threatened. Dorsey
v. Solomon 1 generally upheld a State's power to commit a criminal de-
fendant to a mental hospital after his acquittal by reason of insanity and
without a prior hearing. Nevertheless when the judicial hearing is held,
the State must carry the burden of proving that the individual is unfit for
99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
26 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1979).
27 615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980).
28 596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1979).
29 Id. at 105.
3 584 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1978); see FOURTH CIRcurr REVIEW: Civil Rights, infra at 447.
31 604 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1979); see FOURTH CmCUIT REVIEW: Civil Rights, infra at 438.
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release. According to Mitchell v. Board of Trustees,3 2 terminating or fail-
ing to renew a teacher's contract solely because of her pregnancy is a
prima facie violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; and according to
Paxman v. Campbell3 s it is also actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a
constitutional violation. None of these cases can be characterized as a sig-
nificant cutback or extension of civil rights, but in each case the court
upheld the civil rights claim under existing law.
In a related matter, the Paxman decision also concluded that some
form of municipal immunity is available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the
court could not agree on the nature of the immunity. Perhaps the Su-
preme Court will resolve this issue through a decision in the recently ar-
gued case of Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri.3 4 In Owen, the
Eighth Circuit had allowed a city and its officials to assert a good faith
immunity defense in a section 1983 action.
A third facet of Paxman is also noteworthy. The court determined
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) does not permit certifica-
tion of a class of defendants. That subsection was intended to allow a
class of plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief against named defendants, not
against a class of defendants.
The Erie case of the year is Justice v. Penzoil Co.,3 5 which provides an
interesting examination of the allocation of function between judge and
jury in a federal diversity case. Justice involved a suit .by the owners of
surface rights against the lessee of oil and gas rights, alleging unreasona-
ble use of the mineral rights so as to damage the surface. West Virginia
law allows some damage to the surface as a result of reasonable produc-
tion of gas, and it also dictates that the issue of reasonable use be deter-
mined by the court. The Fourth Circuit recognized, of course, that the
federal rules normally control and would make the reasonableness of a
particular use a jury question. However, because of the meaning that
West Virginia real property law gives to "reasonable" in this context, al-
lowing the jury to decide the issue very well might have infringed on the
substantive real property rights of the mineral rights lessee. Therefore,
the West Virginia rule which requires that the matter be decided by the
judge was held to be binding on a federal court sitting in the exercise of
its diversity jurisdiction.
In two instances, the court took a restrained approach to constitu-
tional matters during the past year. Rejecting decisions of the Second,
Sixth and Eighth Circuits, the court held that there was no implied cause
of action for damages under the fourteenth amendment.36 By so ruling
32 599 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1979); see FOURTH CIRcui REVIEW: Employment Discrimina-
tion, infra at 622.
No. 75-1506 (4th Cir. Jan. 2, 1980) (en banc).
598 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980). Since the writing of this
foreword, the Supreme Court has reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision in Owen.
31 598 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1979); see FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW: Civil Procedure, infra at
433.
36 Cale v. City of Covington, 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978); see FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW:
Constitutional Law, infra at 484.
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the court refused to extend the' Supreme Court's holding in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Agents8 7 to the fourteenth amendment. In Ramey v. Harber,"'
the court refused to give retroactive effect to Elrod v. Burns, 9 which
made discharges of nonconfidential, nonpolicymaking employees solely
for patronage reasons unconstitutional. In Ramey deputy sheriffs were
discharged following an election that brought to office a new sheriff of a
different political persuasion than his predecessor. The court, however,
did not decide whether Elrod would even apply to the instant case, where
a State statute governed the appointment of deputies. As a result, no
binding guidance exists for future application of Elrod in this circuit.
I should add that it has been my good fortune, or misfortune, depend-
ing on the point of view, to have been involved in a disproportionately
large number of the cases selected for discussion by the Law Review staff
in this year's Fourth Circuit Review issue. I hasten to add that I had no
part in their selection. I have tried to be careful not to use this article for
further ax grinding, that is, not to further my point of view where it may
have differed from that of some or all of the members of the court. Any
opinions expressed and conclusions stated are my own alone, and if any
of these may be taken as critical, I assure they are not intended to carry
any intramural disagreements beyond the court's conferences. As our
Judge Craven used to say, we are experts in the alt of disagreement.
:7 402 U.S. 388 (1971).
- 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1978); see FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW: Constitutional Law, infra
at 494.
" 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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